NIGERIA AND BIAFRA: MY STORY
BY GEN. PHILIP EFIONG
A REVIEW AT THE PUBLIC PRESENTATION AT THE SHERATON HOTEL ABUJA ON 31 MARCH 2005
PINI JASON
The
book, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story, by Obong (Gen) Philip Efiong is one
of the most awaited books about the Nigeria and Biafra conflict not only because
it is an account by one of the key participants in the epochal events, but
largely because many of the author’s close friends were aware that the author
had the manuscript with him for many years before its eventual publication. But
sadly the publication came not long after the demise of the author on 6 November
2003. He was buried in a very colourful and heroic way at his hometown, Ibiono
Ibom, Ikot Ekpene, in Akwa Ibom on 28 February 2004. Coincidentally another
Biafran war hero, Lt-Col Ogbugo Kalu, who squared up against Nigeria’s Black
Scorpion, Col Benjamin Adekunle at Bonny, was buried the same 28 February 2004
in Ohafia, Abia State. At Gen Efiong’s burial, I kept wondering what would
become of the book, especially as Col Ogbugo Kalu had gone without documenting
his own account. It is gratifying, therefore, that the US-based Sungai
Corporation eventually published this book. For that, I salute Dr Ugorji O
Ugorji of Sungai Corp and Dr. Philip Efiong Jnr, for their effort in making the
publication of this book a reality. However, it would have made all the
difference to our gathering here today, if Obong (Gen) Philip Efiong were to be
here in person.
Gen Efiong, full name: Philip Asuquo Efiong Udo Ukpong Akpan Ekandem Essien Nkam Obionte, was a self-made man who rose through the ranks to become a Lt-Colonel in the Nigerian Army before the coup of 15 January 1966. Following the coup, he was posted to the Supreme Headquarters as Principal Staff Officer to Major-Gen J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi. He was Acting Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters in May 1966. And in July 1966 he was posted to Kaduna as Deputy Brigade Commander. Following the counter coup of July 1966, Efiong who was a target of the counter coupists, managed to escape to Lagos. And in compliance with orders for all officers to return to their region of origin, he returned to the East before the civil war broke out in 1967. In Biafra, Gen Efiong held various commands as Chief of Logistics, Chief of Staff, Commandant of the Militia and the Chief of General Staff. But what has put Efiong in a position of historical significance is that he was the last Head of State of Biafra and the man who eventually brought the fratricidal war to an end. It is therefore clear that Efiong was in vantage positions during those crucial years in the history of this country. That makes his account one that was deservedly anticipated because he saw it all. Our gathering here today, therefore, is a fitting tribute to the memory of this gallant Nigerian.
Nigeria and Baifra: My Story is a book of 17 chapters and 414 pages, with a foreword surprisingly written by Gen Ibrahim Babangida, GCFR, Military President 1985-93. I shall return to why it is a surprise later. The book also contains a very incisive and scholarly introduction by the historian, Toyin Fatola, a Professor at the University of Texas at Austin and very useful appendices that include the famous Ahiara Declaration and Gen Gowon’s broadcast after the formal surrender of Biafra. There is also a chronology of events as the author remembered them from 28 July 1945 when he joined the Nigerian Army in Enugu to 10 November 1971 when the Federal Military Government published its decision on the fate of the men of the Nigerian Armed Forces who fought on the Biafran side. The details of that release formed part of the appendices too. These appendices make Efiong’s book a collector’s item and a very useful reference material.
Immediately after the author’s preface, the book opens with a prologue in which the author recounts an odd encounter with a strange old man who in November 1965 foretold the looming national tragedy and also promised the author protection because he was a good man. In Chapter One, the author narrates the dramatic events of the 15 January 1966 coup, which took him, like everyone else unawares. He recounts the immediate aftermaths while in Chapter Two he did what he called a critical analysis of the 15 January coup. In this analysis he had concludes, like Gen Alexander Madiebo, that the coup was a revolution, hence his analysis of it includes what he described as the concept of a revolution, some ideals of the revolution, a profile of the coup as well as brief profiles of the key participants like Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Major Adewale Ademoyega, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna, and Major Donatus Okafor. The author tries to accurately identify the ‘Fifth’ major of Ben Gbulie’s Five Majors, the core plotters of the 15 January 1966 coup. Although he said he would not want to be dragged into the controversy of who was the “Fifth Major” he still goes ahead to controvert Ben Gbulie and states: “it is however clear that Ben Gbulie was not the fifth major.” He thinks it was Major Christopher Anuforo.
In Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six, the author examines the performance of Ironsi’s regime, the miscalculations, intrigues, suspicions, rumours, the effect of Decree 34 and the May 1966 disturbances, all of which led inexorably to the reversal of an event which majority of Nigerians initially hailed. In these chapters also, the author recounts his own personal experiences, some of which he called betrayal, and the power plays at the Supreme Headquarters. These chapters also deal with the author’s posting to Kaduna at a time the North was hardly the safest place for a Southern officer. His tenure there was made even more precarious by his attempt to alert the higher military authorities about an impending mutiny, which eventually occurred in July 1966.
Chapter Six is an account of the 29 July 1966 counter coup and the author’s escape from Kaduna to Lagos as well as a brief reconstruction of the abduction and killing of Gen. Ironsi. By the time we get to Chapter Seven, Gen. Gowon had taken over the reins of power and had made the controversial “basis of Nigerian unity” broadcast, the ship of state was tottering badly as anger built up in Eastern Nigeria following the killings of civilian Easterners in the North and Lagos. For the officers of Eastern origin returning to Enugu, life was becoming increasingly difficult and boring. Chapter Eight examines various efforts to steady the floundering ship of state. Such efforts included the Supreme Military Council meeting in Aburi, Ghana, Chief Awolowo’s mission to Enugu and the meeting of the military leaders in Benin.
But it was apparent that Nigeria was heading towards inevitable cataclysm, especially as the interpretation and implementation of the Aburi Accord had become a matter of controversy. The clouds were gathering. And in Chapter Nine it became clear that the center could not hold. Eastern Nigeria was declared the Republic of Biafra on 30 May 1967 after Gen Gowon had split Nigeria into 12 states on 27 May 1967. Chapters 10 to 13 were accounts of the war efforts, such as the invasion of Mid-West and the collapse of that adventure, the domino fall of various Biafran towns and the efforts to stabilize the young Republic, the diplomatic efforts to secure recognition for Biafra and peace for Nigeria. The author recollects his involvement in some of Biafra’s diplomatic efforts and peace missions.
In Chapter 14, although the Biafrans had recaptured Owerri from the Federal troops, it was obvious that the noose was tightening on the Republic. Hunger and disease was taking its toll, war materiel were almost non-existent, as the currency switch in Nigeria was having a debilitating effect on the ability of Biafra to procure arms. Biafra had lost a diplomatic opportunity at Addis Ababa, and the air corridor for relief was effectively shut by Nigeria whose war strategists had insisted that starvation was an instrument of war, the meddling effect spiritualists was undermining troop morale and obedience to command. Chapters 15 and 16 chronicled the last days of Biafra up to the surrender. Chapter 17 is the author’s reflections on the whole sad events.
Two questions people ask, with undisguised anxiety, as soon as they hear about Efiong’s book are, what did he, that is the author, say about Biafra? What did he say about Ojukwu? As for the first question, let me reassure those who have not read the book that Gen Philip Efiong did not denounce or deny Biafra. He did not claim that he was either misled or forced into “rebellion”. When you read the book, you will find that he was too honest and decent to do so. That is not to say that he did not have contrary opinions about how events of those dark days were handled on both sides of the conflict. For example, his reflections on chapter 17 opened with these words: “Throughout the civil war, one of the annoyances that kept nagging at my mind was the question: ‘How do you resolve fundamental differences of a people by force of arms—particularly when the intention, ostensibly is to effect unity, an end result which in itself presupposes the amicable resolution of such fundamental difference?” And in the preface, Gen Efiong also boldly stated:
“Let me make this point that even though I fought on the Biafran side, I have always held the view that the civil war could have been avoided and that secession was not the only single solution to the crisis of 1966. I also do not regard fighting in self-defence as tantamount to a rebellion as some people have tried to make out.”
But there is a deep-seated, even if often unstated, reason why people are anxious to know what Gen Efiong had to say about his role in Biafra. It relates to the ethnic and its effect upon the fate of Biafra as accentuated by the creation of states on 27 May 1967 and the loyalty of the Eastern minorities to the Biafran cause. Efiong seems to have anticipated this and dealt with it decisively. He wrote:
“Let me emphasise here that for one extraordinary moment in our history as a nation the Igbo, one of the three major ethnic groups that make up this country, accepted without question and with complete loyalty and affection, the authority and leadership of a man from a so-called minority area and accepted without question his call to them (and all others who fought along with them) to lay down their arms and return to the Nigerian fold. This supreme trust was based on my proven commitment to justice and fair play, honesty of purpose to the people concerned, rather than on my ability to mislead and deceive them. It is a point that perhaps some of our leaders should bear in mind when dealing with the masses and nationals of this country.”
And may I add that this point is important to those who now base leadership on geography and religion, the very cankerworm that ate up the First Republic!
As for what he said about Gen Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu, Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of Biafra, that is really what you need to settle down in the comfort of your study and read for yourself!
Before Gen Efiong’s account, there have been many books on the civil war. As Efiong wrote:
“Some have written to prove their innocence and helplessness in the roles they had played even if in the event they wielded considerable influence and power on issues of the time. Some have written to show how they won or lost the war, some have written to make quick money because they had a good story to tell, while some have written to justify the principles and causes in which they believe and for which some others lost their lives”.
You may then ask, in which of these categories does the author’s account fall? I will say that, with the exception of few instances, which relate to his personal intimate experiences, the author did not open or cover many new grounds in the story of the civil war. Rather his account is largely ruminations that offer new perspectives to many of the faulty assumptions, rash comments and hasty conclusions by earlier writers about events leading to, and during the civil war. In retrospect, all perspectives of events are usually more insightful when viewed with hindsight. So it is in this book. But these insights, it must be remembered, were not available to either the actors in the whirligig of events or the early chroniclers. Therefore, the author’s book benefited from a lot of hindsight and detachment. If his purpose was to correct some of the misconceptions about roles of certain dramatis personae in the crises of 1966 to 1970, he succeeded a great deal. And in doing this, he avoided prejudice.
Nigeria and Biafra: My Story is written in a frank and honest style. The language is elegant, engaging and lucid. The author’s articulation is measured and mature, and as Gen Babangida observed in his foreword, “it is not made up of tantrums in reaction to what others said.” Indeed, it is a mark of the character of the author that he did not write with bitterness. Nigeria was very unfair to Gen Efiong. Ojukwu who led Biafra received pardon. But Efiong who brought the war to an end was dismissed and remained dismissed till he died. This injustice to a man who played such a pivotal role in the history of our nation was never corrected by successive regimes. It is still not too late for Nigeria to honour and do the right thing for Obong Efiong!
As I said earlier, Gen Babangida’s foreword is a surprise for one reason. For many people who, because of our history, have come to associate the military and Generals, including retired ones, with coercive, brusque and abrasive language, Gen Babangida’s foreword is a good PR for retired Generals. It is sonorous, elegant and breezy in style. But that is not the surprise, if you know the resourcefulness of the man called IBB. The surprise really had to do with locating Babangida’s place in the Biafra story. If he was writing a foreword to a book about the crushing of the “rebels” I think it would not arouse as much curiosity. Given that he was on the other side of the conflict, and given his rank during the conflict, people are therefore curious about his relationship with the author and what he had to say. That again is a very strong reason to buy the book!
But there is another way to look at the matter. Gen Efiong wrote essentially as a Nigerian who was a witness to events that led inexorably to Biafra. In that context, therefore, Gen Babangida, as a Nigerian, deserves his say, even if as a person who was on the other side. The two views balance out each other, and I think that in dealing with the Nigerian problem, our views, and indeed Nigeria, should no longer be dichotomized as Biafran or Nigerian, secessionist or Federalist, victor or vanquished! There should be a Nigerian view in healing the wounds of the past. That is the only way we can honour the memory and legacies of all the heroes who laid down their lives for this nation. As Efiong cautioned, “Let us not deceive ourselves that there could not be a recurrence if we fall back into our bad, old political, socioeconomic, nepotic and inter-tribal habits”.
Gen Efiong’s account is not
the final or in fact the most important unwritten account of the civil war. The
civil war was a Nigerian event. All the actors acted while they occupied public
offices of the Nigerian state. Therefore their actions and experiences belong to
the public, rather than private archives. Therefore Nigeria deserves two more
accounts of the events of 1966 to 1970 from General Yakubu Gowon and Gen. Ojukwu.
The time is ripe for Nigeria to know where the rain started drenching her.
The publishers, Sungai Corporation, did a first-class job on the production of the book. There is hardly any proof error. The printing is good and the fonts are inviting. The cover design is exciting with a back cover blobs by distinguished Nigerians, although Gen Efiong’s photograph on the cover has faded with time. The book is illustrated with useful diagrams and photographs to aid recall. As stated earlier, the appendices and the index make the book a must for any reader or researcher on Nigerian history. Nigeria and Biafra: My Story is an account by an insider, a patriot, a distinguished Nigerian Army officer and a trusted Biafran Army General.
@ www.kwenu.com, Monday April 4, 2005