Unfortunately, the tone of the international mediators portrayed bad omen for peace. It was bad omen in the sense that the initial reactions from the OAU, the Commonwealth and the UN gave indication of the direction any mediation effort would go. Fredrick Forsyth, Suzanne Cronje, John Stremlau and many others argue that decisions concerning peace talks were taken in advance. Forsyth further asserts that there was allegation that the US and Britain even promised cash gifts to African countries to persuade them not to back Biafra.

A total of seven official peace talks were undertaken and these were named after the state capitals where they took place - Kinshasa (Congo), London (Great Britain), Lagos (Nigeria), Kampala (Uganda), Niamey (Niger), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Algiers (Algeria). There were also some private and non-official initiatives from individuals and religious groups. In the end, none of the peace talks got close to any meaningful resolution but not without genuine struggle by some of those who took part in the flawed negotiations.

As the political turmoil in the aftermath of the Biafran secession boiled in Nigeria, the ripple effects sent shocking waves of apprehension to many African countries. Consequently, some African leaders began to voice out serious concerns about the would-be spiral consequences of the crisis. The Organisation of African Unity, OAU (now African Union AU), was at this time, preparing for its Fourth Annual Summit billed to take place in Kinshasa the capital of Congo on September 10, 1967. This concern was even more vigorous among the East African countries for, as early as June 1967, the Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda started muting the idea that the crisis in Nigeria must be taken seriously by African leaders. He urged the East African Community to review it and arrange a negotiated settlement. At the same time, the Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere also took keen interest in the matter. Both of these Presidents had no vital economic interests to fight for in Nigeria and were seen as truly neutral persons. Apart from this aspect of neutrality, two factors appeared to have facilitated East African interest and subsequent support for Biafra by two of its leading Presidents. First, Ojukwu had, before hostility began, started a diplomatic shuttle in East Africa where two prominent Igbo intellectuals � Austin Okwu, a seasoned diplomat and Professor Chike Obi (Professor of Mathematics) had penetrated the parliaments. Second, the Zambian High Commissioner in Nigeria, Matiya Nglande had visited Eastern Nigeria (now Biafra) and had seen for himself the injustice meted out on the people of this area and became genuinely concerned about their plight.

Also, before hostilities began, Milton Obote of Uganda sent a message to Gowon urging him to promise that he would not attack Biafra until the East African Summit took place. Gowon rejected the plea and attacked Biafra on July 6, 1967. There was another request by the East African leaders pleading with Gowon to allow a peace mission to visit Nigeria. This invitation was also turned down. Amongst the four East African Presidents, Nyerere and Kaunda showed more understanding of the plight of Biafra. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, who had served as Chairman of the OAU ad hoc committee in the Congo crisis of 1961, was quite cautious and reluctant to undertake any peace initiative. Milton Obote, on his part, was also careful as he too was facing ethnic problems and threat of secession from the Baganda province in Uganda. When the East African initiative failed, President Mobutu Sese Seko garnered support from other African heads of state to present the matter before the forthcoming OAU Summit. However, other sources indicate that it was the US which requested Mobutu to make the move. This latter appears more plausible as later development in the process of mediation unfolded. Hence, OAU's entry and effective control of mediation efforts obstructed rather than facilitated peaceful resolution. It was a perfect instance when mediators became obstacle to peace.

Meanwhile, two other peace initiatives were proposed prior to the Kinshasa Conference. These requests came from Dahomey (now republic of Benin) and Ghana, respectively. Nigeria, while expressing appreciation for the interest shown by her neighbours in the crisis however rejected both appeals, insisting that the crisis was exclusively internal matter and that such initiatives should come through the AOU. Afraid that these peace initiatives may gain currency among African leaders, the Gowon Government sent out envoys to OAU members and got assurances from many of them that the matter would not even feature on the Organisation's agenda in the Kinshasa Summit. As the war intensified, the United States began to show some signs of anxiety over Soviet arms sale to Nigeria. Hence, Nigeria became worried that a US-led peace initiative might slip through and stop the war prematurely. In light of what has been mentioned above, Nigeria's interpretation the intention of the US appeared peremptory and unjustified as shall be seen later.

On the eve of the Kinshasa Summit, the US recommended that a special committee under the auspices of the OAU be set up to look into the escalating crisis. It appears that the US did not disclose to Gowon her position on the matter and why it wanted the OAU to handle the peace talks. Subsequent events made it clear that the US had a strategic reason why it wanted the OAU to be in charge of any mediation effort. Furthermore, shortly before the Kinshasa Summit, Ojukwu made a passionate appeal for peace talks to resume and called particularly on the OAU to take up the matter in its forthcoming Summit. Ojukwu held up an olive branch to Gowon and outlined areas of cooperation between Nigeria and Biafra such as railway, road, habour, aviation, post and telecommunications, customs and monetary issues. However, Gowon's response was a flat no and insistence on a reunited Nigeria. This position was maintained till the end of the war.

Meanwhile, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Kinshasa began on September 4 and lasted till September 11, 1967. The Council meeting normally prepares the agenda for the Heads of State meeting. Okoi Arikpo, Gowon's External Affairs minister had a short but firm mandate for the preparatory meeting: "Under no circumstances allow the Nigerian crisis to appear on the agenda for the OAU Summit." To back up his mandate, Arikpo would cite Article II (2) of the OAU Charter, which states that member states should not interfere in the internal affairs of other members unless invited to do so. He also insisted that Nigeria was not keen to invite the mediation of a third party. Gowon also mandated Arikpo to stage a walk-out from the Summit should the matter, by any means, appear on the agenda or be mentioned during the Summit.

As the unfolding of events in Africa and elsewhere in the world would reveal, every conflict or war has the potential to attract responses from the international community especially the big powers. This is because a lot of calculations come into play such as arms supply, spare parts, likely intervention etc. All in all, any armed conflict is bound to raise international relations� temperature in the world depending on what strategic interest the world powers have in the area in question. The Nigerian delegation was ready to allow only a total condemnation of the Biafran secession by the Summit. The OAU Secretary-General Diallo Telli confirmed the Nigerian position and noted that the only mention of the Nigerian crisis was an ill-fated and short-lived peace initiative sponsored by Lesotho. The Lesotho initiative died a natural death because Nigeria was strongly opposed to it. On the ground that Biafra was not a recognised country, the Zairian government deported the Biafran delegation, which had arrived Kinshasa airport to present the Biafran own side of the matter to the OAU ministerial Council meeting. This was perhaps, a tip of iceberg of what was coming, signaling a pro-Nigerian approach by the OAU and this position continued unchanged till the end of the war.

The Summit began on September 14 1967 and closed on 16 of the same month. Presidents from thirty-nine member states were in attendance, while others sent in delegations. Gowon, at the last minute, sent Obafemi Awolowo to represent the federal government of Nigeria. In spite of the hope and assurances made by the host country that the matter would not feature on the Summit agenda, Awolowo skillfully found out that Mobutu, Obote and Kaunda were planning to bring up the Biafran crisis to the Summit. Awolowo described his shrewd foiling of the plan as follows:

Meanwhile, Ojukwu had also sent in a letter of appeal for a negotiated settlement to the heads of state. He argued that based on an apparent stalemate in the war following Biafra's lightening expedition in the Midwest, a negotiated settlement was imperative. The Biafran White Paper appeared persuasive and Ojukwu urged the heads of state to take individual and collective actions should Nigeria shun peace offers from such distinguished elder statesmen of Africa. But Awolowo was unrelenting; he went from door to door threatening each head of state that Nigeria would walk out of the Summit if any mention of the Nigeria-Biafra crisis came up.

As it turned out, Awolowo's lobbying was a partial success for, apart from the passing statement about the Biafran crisis by Emperor Haile Selassie; the topic was never mentioned again during the deliberation. But a few African heads of state were still bent on bringing the OAU into the peace initiative. Hence on September 12, 1967, Presidents Mobutu Sese Seko (Congo), William Tubman (Liberia), Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia), Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), Hamani Diori (Niger), Haile Selassie (Ethiopia) and General Joseph Ankrah (Ghana) met with Awolowo to discuss the crisis. It was agreed that no formal record of this meeting would be kept. The federal delegation was apprehensive that the array of these African statesmen might change the situation against Nigeria. A number of factors account for this apprehensive move. On the one hand, Diori and Ahidjo were neighbours to Nigeria. On the other hand, Diori was the Chairman of OCAM coupled with the fact that both Diori and Ahidjo had strong connections with France, the latter a major power, perceived to be sympathetic to the Biafran cause. Another source of worry for Nigeria stemmed from the fact that both Tubman and Selassie could be influenced by the United States against Nigeria. It was also calculated that, with the United States and France pushing the matter, it would be difficult for Nigeria to continue to suppress it and prevent the OAU from having a hand in resolving the issue. All these calculations turned out to be wrong as the US was solidly behind Nigeria and was in fact, tele-guiding the peace talks.

The Nigerian delegation fears appeared to have been justified though from another angle. Kaunda, with the backing of OCAM, had proposed a resolution which would empower the OAU to order an immediate cease-fire and thereby compel Nigeria to negotiate on equal basis with Biafra. The bottom-line of the resolution would have amounted to a de facto recognition of Biafra by the OAU. This appeared to be a really genuine effort to stop the war. Unfortunately, the Nigerian delegation destroyed this plan. Awolowo continued to cite the principle of non-interference and threatened that if the OAU went ahead with this proposal, Nigeria would not only withdraw her membership of the Organisation but that she would effectively sponsor rebel groups seeking to topple their governments anywhere in Africa. This threat changed the tempo of the mediation effort. Consequent upon the acrimonious and tensed atmosphere that the discussion with Kaunda and the Nigerian delegation assumed, Kaunda left in anger and this gave Awolowo a good chance to push further the principle of non-interference.

Thus, Kaunda's most hopeful chance of a peaceful resolution of the conflict came to naught. Instead of his proposed Mandatory Committee, which according to OAU Charter has more power, a lame-dock Consultative Committee was instituted to please the Federal Government of Nigeria. In fact, the Consultative Committee had only an advisory status and the Military Government in Nigeria would not in any way, be bound to accept its recommendations. Gowon's consent was sought and obtained through the United States embassy in Lagos, which relayed the phone call to him. Kaunda, frustrated with the way things turned out, was not even in the six-man Consultative Committee. In the end, the Communiqué issued by the Summit was overly partial in deference to Nigeria. It read:

Now that the conflict has finally transcended national boundary and became a regional matter albeit according to the whims and caprices of Nigeria without regard to Biafra, the prospect of the matter going further to the United Nations was also foreclosed. Hence, the then UN Secretary-General U Thant maintained that since the matter was already being looked into by the OAU, it would be inauspicious and unnecessary for the UN to involve itself in such a conflict much to the displeasure of the OAU. Meanwhile, Nigeria had already sought and obtained assurances that the UN would not take up the matter even before the Kinshasa Summit took place. Thant's unwillingness to use the mediating role of the UN was a direct contradiction to the position he pushed so vigorously in the early 1960s. Then he had emphasised that if the United Nations was to effectively maintain peace, it must persuade the member states to give up the notion of absolute sovereignty. Apart from this reason, he argued, it was still necessary to reduce the rights of states such as renunciation of threat or the use of force as an instrument of policy, the reduction of armed forces and the undertaking to submit disputes to the arbitration of an international judiciary.

Apart from placating the federal government of Nigeria, the outcome of the Summit had other disadvantages for Biafra. First, the East African countries that appeared to have sufficient interest in ending the war back-pedaled and reluctantly supported a rather partisan resolution on the conflict. Second, the impending diplomatic recognition of Biafra by Tanzania and Zambia was delayed for seven months. Had this recognition come at the time of apparent military stalemate, more countries could have joined in recognising Biafra's right to self-determination. The Biafran government reaction to the outcome of the Summit was cautious.

In the main, the Kinshasa Summit was a setback for Biafra for the momentum inspired by the East African peace initiative was scuttled by Awolowo and the OAU's inability to wriggle out of the double-edged sword of territorial sovereignty and non-interference. However, as shall be seen later, these legal principles were not the real reasons why self-determination was not granted to Biafra.