Joe Garba’s Legacy
Oseloka Obaze
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
June
2, 2009, marks the seventh anniversary of Joe Garba’s death. For those who
still fondly remember Joe Garba, it is noteworthy that the anniversary
coincides, discernibly, with the declining fortunes of Nigerian foreign
policy. Also noteworthy, is the stark contrast between present realities and
the robust days of Nigerian foreign policy, when Joe Garba was the vicar in
charge. Inevitably, one begins to wonder what happened to Joe Garba’s foreign
policy legacy.
In two days, President Barack Obama will travel to Egypt to deliver a speech on US-Muslim world relationship before visiting Ghana on 10-11 July – on his maiden official trip to sub-Saharan Africa. Whitehouse Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, avowal that “the President and Mrs. Obama look forward to strengthening the US relationship with one of our most trusted partners in sub-Saharan Africa, and to highlighting the critical role that sound governance and civil society play in promoting lasting development,” was not a direct rebuke of Nigeria. However, Gibbs’s words resonated for what he did not say; Nigeria no longer enjoys a “most trusted partner” status. Add to that, the fact that President Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania became the first African head of state invited to the Obama White House. Until recently, such honors were, in the African context, reserved for Nigeria. In fact, President George W. Bush's first visit to Africa in July 2003 was to Senegal, South Africa, Botswana, Uganda and Nigeria, but not Ghana.
It is public knowledge that President Yar’Adua recently tasked Chief Emeka Anyaoku to articulate a strategic vision and policy on how to reform Nigeria’s foreign policy and faltering international image. One can safely deduce that Nigeria’s waning influence in international politics, as evidenced by her absence at the recent G-20 Summit has perturbed President Yar’Adua. Additionally, Yar’Adua must be aware that Nigeria’s campaign to secure a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council at the close of 2009 is encountering some difficulties. Nigeria’s recent re-election to the UN Human Right Council notwithstanding, the country is badly in need of a rebranded foreign policy. Seemingly, that is what President Yar’Adua told his foreign policy advisers before handing Chief Anyaoku his mandate. While Chief Anyaoku is eminently qualified to lead the foreign policy reform process, for the effort to succeed, Nigeria must return to the fundamentals that once made her the uncontested lynchpin, bellwether and predominant foreign policy voice in Africa.
President Yar’Adua must also be troubled that though considered prima-facie qualified and therefore, a presumptive member of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA), Nigeria is still not a member of that south-south international cooperation body. That the IBSA countries share with Nigeria the common aspiration of eventually becoming permanent members of an expanded UN Security Council and being key players and coordinators in global matters pertaining to global agriculture, trade, culture, and defence and international peace and security, must be disconcerting for Nigerians. Whereas Nigeria has solid and cordial bilateral relations with the IBSA countries, when the Troika met in Brasília on 13 September 2006, for their 1st Summit Meeting, Nigeria was absent from the forum as it is, till this day. So, while individually the three IBSA countries are partners with Nigeria, they have banded as Nigeria’s competitor in some critical areas.
It is noteworthy, that well before apartheid ended in South Africa, former President Frederik Willem de Klerk declared Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, as nations he believed that would form the four power points on the African continent. Remarkably, as de Klerk’s grand vision has evolved, South Africa remains the pivotal arrowhead in the four power points structure; another obvious point of consternation that speaks volumes of Nigeria’s diminished international stature.
While there are some current foreign policy tenets, observers believe that that Nigeria’s current foreign policy lacks balance, focus, realism and that underlining foreign policy paradigms stand challenged. Poor leadership and poor policy response is believed to have combined to create fault lines, dissonance, and flatlining of Nigeria’s once robust foreign policy. In this context, one only needs to note the company that Nigeria keeps presently or does not keep. Indeed, most attentive Nigerians consider it impractical to continue laying claim to Nigeria being a great country, even when the parameters of such coveted but debatable greatness are visibly lacking. Yet there is hardly any indication of concomitant hardheaded analysis to determine if prevailing regional, continental and global multilateral politics are still in tandem with Nigerian foreign policy interests.
It is against the background of an egregiously damaged foreign policy and waning influence that one must revisit the rich but neglected foreign policy legacy late Joseph Nanven Garba earned for and bequeathed to Nigeria, which now stand despoiled, unappreciated and unutilized. It is highly implausible that anyone could honestly write a serious exposé on Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence, without a detailed reference to Joe Garba’s role, even though his tenure as foreign minister was one of the shortest. Hence, scholars, students and even casual observers, continue to admit that Garba’s tenure as Nigeria’s foreign minister remains one of the most vibrant and productive, and ultimately, retains credence as the watershed and robust years that set the high standard and high expectations people continue to have of Nigerian foreign policy. Regrettably, Nigeria can no longer sustain the international influence she once had; and living on old glory is hardly a viable option. Indeed, evidence abound that her foreign policy is wobbly. More painfully, other nations now recognize Nigeria’s diminished international influence as a resultant corollary of her lackluster foreign policy.
Paradoxically, many still believe that Nigeria and South Africa are engaged in a leadership role competition in Africa. This notion is attractive but fallacious, as South Africa has frog-leaped ahead of Nigeria. One needs only to revisit Garba’s 1992 speech at Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) at Kuru, titled, “Nigeria-South African Relations In A Post-Apartheid Era,” for answers. His prescient words: “It is safe to say that South Africa is very well-positioned to assume the role of an economic leader and a power house for both regional and continental development if and when it resolves its political anomalies….[Yet] our optimism has become an impediment. Also, there is this attitude by those in policymaking positions that tend toward an inclination of something-for-nothing. This is not right. There can be no foreign policy based on altruism. It will be fallacious to believe that we can base our national interest, and to wit, foreign policy on anything other than a quid pro quo. It is equally erroneous to believe that any policy that does not serve the interest of Nigeria and Nigerians has an abiding merit. Yes, it may for others, but that is not the objective of representing Nigeria to the rest of the world.” Undeniably, Nigeria has glossed over these admonishments in places like Zimbabwe, Liberia and Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea.
Next summer, South Africa will become the first African country to host the FIFA World Cup. That seemingly innocuous fact, serves among others, as a reminder of the prevailing degree of separation between Nigeria and South Africa and the impact of the negligent diminution of Nigeria’s influence, by her past and present leaders.
In spite of these trends, a visionary and strategic foreign policy – always an imperative -- serves one goal: national interest in all its ramifications. However, such foreign policy constructs and their validity are never about influence alone, but about the power of influence or its lack thereof. Yet Nigeria is visibly lethargic about adequately financing and emboldening her foreign policy, thus hampering her missions and envoys aboard with impecunious situations. The negative results of this reality ironically, still elude Nigeria’s foreign policy architects and executors. Cumulatively, the rude and painful paradox of Nigeria’s foreign policy is that policies are no longer framed with uncompromising national interest in mind, or with the consideration of the larger international interest.
Well before Bolaji Akinyemi sought to place Nigeria in the thick of global policymaking, via the Lagos Forum (Concert of Medium Powers) and Ibrahim Gambari enunciated the Concentric Circle Approach as the pedestal for Nigerian foreign policy architecture, Joe Garba placed Nigeria squarely on the international arena with an assertive foreign policy. During Garba’s stewardship, Nigeria led and the rest of Africa followed; and Western nations cued their African policies on Nigeria’s presumptive position. Whilst Lagos Forum eventually floundered, it is to Akinyemi’s enduring vision and credit that the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) he founded, remains one of the key leveraging tools of Nigerian foreign policy; much less so, the African Development Bank (ADB), where once Nigeria used its facilities and the leverage of her oil wealth to assist needy African nations.
Traditional diplomacy has long hinged on the notion made popular by Sir Henry Wotton, that “an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie aboard for the good of his country”. Conversely, Joe Garba, proved and often said so publicly and through his conduct, that “a diplomat is an honest man sent abroad to tell the blunt truth for the good of his country”. Frequently, Garba spoke so bluntly for Nigeria and Africa sometimes in ways that was discomforting to some of his interlocutors. Nevertheless, he unfailingly, delivered the message and the desired outcome without ambiguity. As Kaye Whiteman, observed of Garba, “in maturity, he retained his brusque forthrightness, but remained a valued member of his country’s foreign policy establishment.” To this, one merely needs to add, and his place as a valued and dominant African voice, too! It is hardly surprising that Garba’s interlocutors would perceive someone who reveled on brutal candor differently. It was, perhaps, that stark paradox and perceptive dichotomy that prompted the following remarks by Prince Julius Adelusi-Adeluyi: “Joe [Garba] meant different things to different people. Something was however consistent about him in his lifetime. He always sought to make a positive difference wherever he found himself. He was an uncommon and determined man.” This surely is a broadly held view.
Garba was also a remarkable problem solver. In policymaking, Garba readily recognized the vital place of “principles” which, to paraphrase George Kennan, “accorded with the nature, the needs, the interests and the limitations of our country.” He had the knack of thinking on his feet, in serious, sublime and mundane matters. He always contemplated the imponderables. Such abilities underlined his gravitas and placed Nigeria’s voice squarely in the realm of notable advocates on any issue he dealt with. As general, foreign minister, ambassador, chair of the UN anti-apartheid committee, president of UN General Assembly, director-general of NIPSS or private citizen, when Garba spoke, people listened. Such were his bona fides as an interlocutor, a reality that mixed well with his poised persona. As Professor Jean Herskovit remarked, Garba “had enduring faith in the possibility of solving intractable problems, whether in Nigeria or Africa or beyond.”
Unsurprisingly, Joe Garba left an enduring legacy that speaks still to the fact that, activism in foreign policy required having the resounding voice and unfettered visibility. In no small measure, Garba in his time offered Nigeria both variables, through his assured personality and his diligent handling of dossiers within his remit. Admittedly, diplomacy is all about building alliances, leveraging a nation’s influence and clearly, meeting set goals, even when the situation warranted using national assets or reprisal as a tool. Garba understood this and practiced it well. Yet while not oblivious to the inevitability of diplomatic quid pro quos, Garba never subscribed to diplomatic niceties and calculated pandering as basis for blocking a forthright approach to tackling international crises. He fully understood that effectively pursuing and achieving national interest goals was not a task commonly realized with pedestrian personnel and through vacuous policies, prevarication or doublespeak.
Another Garba legacy was in the realm of effective decision-making. As Dr. Ugorji O. Ugorji, remarked of Garba, “He took risks and accepted the consequences of his risks. He was all about excellence - he demanded it, he respected it, and he aspired to it and rose to it always. He was quick with praise, and painfully blunt with criticism. He was full of hope for Nigeria, particularly for the youth of Nigeria.” I have heard it said numerous times, that Joe Garba was an effective foreign minister because he was also a member of the ruling Supreme Military Council. True as this may be, he was not the only Nigerian foreign minister so favored. I sincerely believe that Garba was effective, because he always placed the nation above self, as his many documented actions would testify.
As foreign minister, Garba bucked the trend to promote middle ranking career Foreign Service Officers to ambassadorial rank, strategically placing them where their talents were most needed by Nigeria. He also insisted reserving a higher ratio of diplomatic postings to career Foreign Service Officers, while tapping talents from the academia to balance of theory and practice and counterbalance groupthink amongst the paladins of the profession. As Permanent Representative to the UN in the 1980s, he assembled a team of the best and the brightest Nigerian Foreign Service Officers – including Oluseye Oduyemi, E. Eloho Otobo, M. Ghali Umar and Gordon H. Bristol - to work with him. In acknowledgement, Ambassador J.J. Lewu, a ranking FSO, observed, “such a unique arrangement would not be repeated for a very long time in the history of the Nigerian Foreign Service”.
Always the idealistic patriot, Garba paid severely for some of his positions and beliefs. A detribalized believer in diversity, he passed up joining the ruling PDP in 1999, and found himself on the opposite sides of former associates and friends like Olusegun Obasanjo, T.Y. Danjuma and Solomon Lar. Surprisingly he lost his senatorial bid to represent the Plateau South constituency to Silas Janfa, an obscure local politician from his homestead who belonged to PDP. Later on, Garba would pass up the offer of a high-level UN job under Kofi Annan, and elected instead to become the Director-General of NIPSS, simple because he wanted to help shape public policy in a democratic Nigeria. Whereas, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa postulated Nigeria’s African-centered foreign policy, Joe Garba underlined the imperatives of principled pragmatism that would allow for the much-needed policy robustness, clarity, continuity and desirable outcome. What stood Garba apart for his peers and successors was his willingness to learn, to listen, and to be proactive. He fully understood the imperatives of national interest, a trait possibly linked to his military training.
Another factor that set Garba’s tenure apart from those of preceding and succeeding foreign ministers was his regimental approach and adherence to his mandate as contained in the foreign policy guidelines laid out on 29 June 1976 by General Olusegun Obasanjo, in the so-called “Dodan Doctrine”. The doctrines clearly spelt-out Nigerian foreign policy objectives, to include, inter alia, “defense of our sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; the creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and in the rest of the world which would foster Nigerian national self-reliance and rapid economic development ~this would facilitate the defense of the independence of all African countries; the promotion of equality and self-reliance in Africa and the rest of the developing world; the promotion and defense of social justice and respect for human dignity, especially the dignity of the Blackman; and the promotion and defense of world peace”.
Should one contemplate the most enduring legacy that Garba bestowed on Nigeria, it has to be his commitment to ensuring policy continuity by documenting events. His memoirs as foreign minister, Diplomatic Soldiering (1987) and his many lectures and speeches on array global issues stand in testimony. Likewise, his tenure as President of the 44th UN General Assembly is documented for posterity. In these and other published works, Garba elucidated what, why, and if, of the policies that he articulated or executed. So far, only Joe Garba and Ibrahim Gambari have to my knowledge, written memoirs about their respective tenures as Nigerian foreign ministers. Yet Garba embarked on many diplomatic ventures, which he felt sufficiently confident to carry out with the required confidentiality. Hence, Garba did more for several African countries than is publicly known. I hope that diplomatic scholars and historians will ferret out those events eventually. Even so, I have always felt that initiating the publishing his collected speeches might inspire that inevitable research process.
Re-reading Garba’s various lectures and speeches recently, I came to realize factors that might be responsible for the present ambiguities, dissonance and malaise in Nigeria’s foreign policy. It is hardly the absence of national interest considerations as much as how the mishmash of policy and principles with partisan and personal considerations had subjugated the broader vision and commitment to national interest goals. Such policy disconnect is better valued through George Kennan’s observation: “actions have a way of carrying over almost imperceptibly from the realm of principles into that of policy, where they develop a momentum of their own, in which the original consideration of principles are forgotten or are compelled to yield to what appears to be necessities of the moment.” Certainly, the crisis of Nigerian democracy ought not to be a basis for foreclosing on an activist foreign policy. Nigeria needs to transcend the prevailing dysfunctional foreign policy, linked inexorably to perceived “necessities of the moment,” by returning to and adhering to those cardinal principles and national commitment that guided foreign policy in Joe Garba’s era.
Joe Garba’s term as foreign minister remains Nigeria’s best and shining moment. Measured against succeeding instances of foreign policy flashes of brilliance, Garba’s tenure stands unchallenged and unmatched. Joe Garba’s rich legacy speaks for itself. Although some may chose to forget, some of us would rather not.
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Mr. Oseloka Obaze writes from the United States. He was Joe Garba’s Special Assistant from 1987 to 1990 and collaborated with him in writing two books, The Honor to Serve (1993) and Fractured History (1995). He is currently editing a volume of Joe Garba’s collected speeches, by the same title.